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REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
AND TITLE INSURANCE
By G. H. MAYES, JR.,*
The enactment by Congress of legislation providing favorable tax
treatment1 for ,the income and distributions of certain qualified real
estate investment trusts2 'has created a new market for title insurance.
Because of the increased real estate activity generated under this new
law, title insurance companies are being increasingly called upon to
insure the acquisition, conveyances, leases and mortgages of such trusts.3
This article will seek to point out the problems encountered in in-
suring these transactions and how the problems can best be solved,
consistent with good underwriting practices. It will not be the purpose
of this article to treat those problems concerning REITS which have
no relation to the title insurance aspects, such as the attempted con-
version of the beneficial owner's interest from realty to personalty,
the transferability of shares of interest, the tort liability of the bene-
ficial owners, the governmental regulation of business trusts, the tax-
ation of such trusts, 4 and others.
Tm REIT: FIsH OR FOWL?
The -true nature of a Massachusetts trust has always been a matter
of concern to writers and courts. The Massachusetts trust was initiated
*Title Officer, Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, Richmond, Virginia. B.A.
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126 U.S.C. §§ 856-58 (Supp. II, 1959-61). This law was signed by President
Eisenhower on September 14, 196o. 74 Stat. ioo3. Under it, qualifying trusts are
allowed conduit or pass-through treatment of income, provided 9o per cent distribu-
tion -thereof is made to beneficial owners.
2A real estate investment trust will be hereinafter referred to a a REIT. The
REIT is nothing more or less than the old Massachusetts trust, sometimes called
a business or common law trust, drawn to qualify under the Federal tax provisions.
3The reason for the increased activity is that from 1935 until the present legis-
lation trusts had been treated as "associations" taxable as corporations. See Coleman
v. Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369 (1935); Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 US. 362
(1935); Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). This had meant double taxa-
tion, both to the trust upon receipt of income and to the beneficial owner upon
distribution to him. Under the new law, this double taxation will not be incurred
if the trust distributes to the beneficial owners go per cent of its taxable income in
the taxable year, 26 U.S.C. 857 (a) Supp. II, 1959-61).
'See generally 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 357-416 (1953); Annot., 156
A.L.R. 22 (1945); 12 C.J.S. Business Trusts §§ 1-36 (1938); Symposium, 48 Va. L. Rev.
1007-1148 (1962).
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in that state because corporations were prohibited from acquiring and
developing real property without a special act of the legislature. These
trusts were created to fill this void and, because of the purpose they ful-
filled, were closely akin to corporations in structure. When this vehicle
was introduced into other states, it was met with varying degrees of en-
thusiasm. Some states felt that it was an impostor and an encroachment
upon the domain of private corporations, whose rights and powers
could only be obtained by compliance with applicable corporation
statutes. Others felt that because of the close association among share-
holder-beneficiaries and the power exerted over the actions and destiny
of the trust by these shareholders, it was a partnership or joint stock
association and that the provision for nonliability of certificate holders
could not be given effect. And yet others recognized it as a true trust
if certain conditions were satisfied, conditions which will be discussed
later. Because of this varying approach, it became, and still is, popular
to discuss these trusts in terms of their "validity" in any particular
jurisdiction. This is an inaccurate term because most courts in discuss-
ing "validity," are usually addressing their attention to only one fine
point, such as the liability or nonliability of shareholders, the taxa-
tion of -the trust interests, etc. Whether the trust is "valid" or not de-
pends upon the context in which the term is used and the nature of
the problem confronted.5 It could be a partnership as to third party
creditors and still be a trust 'inter sese.' We shall be interested herein
in isolating that situation in which, as far as title to real property is
concerned, a true trust is created with legal title in the trustees for
the benefit of the shareholders, as compared with those situations in
which title may vest otherwise, perhaps in the beneficial owners as
partners.
Corporation or Trust
The fact that in any particular jurisdiction a REIT may be
considered to be a corporation does not seem ,to pose a serious title
problem. It is submitted that in such a jurisdiction a deed to A, B and
C, as Trustees of X Real Estate Investment Trust would create a valid
title in A, B and C upon trust. That the X Real Estate Investment
Trust is deemed a corporation under the state laws would not seem to
affect the vesting of legal title in A, B and C, and they would hold in
a fiduciary capacity for X regardless of its true nature-trust or corpor-
ation. The unlawful exercise or usurpation of corporation functions
rSee 2 Bogert, op. cit. Supra note 4, at § 293; Annot., 156 A.L.R. at 52.
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and attributes by X could only be challenged by the sovereign6 in a
,quo warranto' or similar action. The beneficial owners, by virtue of
their participation in the venture, would be estopped to attack the
corporation or to claim rights as partners or tenants in common in
the corpus of the estate.7 And even if not estopped, they would be
precluded from any action against the title insurer by the express
language of Paragraph 2(d) of the Conditions and Stipulations of the
policy wherein it is stated "This policy does not insure against loss or
damage by reason of... defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims
against the title as insured or other matters... created, suffered or
agreed to by the Insured ... ."8 One case has specifically held that even
though the purported trust was a corporation and amenable to the
state security laws, the trustees had power to hold and convey title to
real estate.9
It is submitted that A, B and C would hold legal title and be able
to convey the same, whether as trustees with power of sale or as officers
of a corporation by estoppel, with power conferred by the corporate
"articles." It would seem that the critical factor is that the rights of the
shareholders in a corporation are almost identical to those of the
beneficial owners of a REIT. In each instance they have no right to
specific corporate or trust property. That right, including the power
of disposition, is in the Board of Directors and the Trustees, respec-
tively.
In many states there will be found statutes, such as Blue Sky Laws,
which control or regulate the activities of REITs, even though ex-
pressly mentioning only corporations. And trusts may also be the sub-
ject of express regulation by the state.10 But this writer has not found
a statute which voids completely the actions of such trusts for a vio-
lation of the legislation. Usually, a monetary penalty is imposed."
Partnership or Trust
By far the greater problem to title insurers has been that gen-
erated in those states which hold that a partnership or joint stock as-
sociation is created, rather than a true trust, either because of the policy
OThomle v. Soundview Pulp Co., x81 Wash. 1, 42 P.9d 19 (1935); Hayes v.
Central Business Property Co., i4o Wash. 596, 249 Pac. 1057 (1926). See generally
5 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 2342 (1952).
Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 6, § 3941.
'American Title Association Owner's Policy-Standard Form B-ig6o.
9Belt v. Griggs, 137 Kan. 429, 20 P.2d 570 (1933).
"See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann., ch. 609 (1927).
uIbid.
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of the state or because of the element of control granted to beneficial
owners. In such jurisdictions it is not clear that A, B and C (in our
typical example) hold legal title. It is possible, and probable, that the
beneficial owners, as co-partners, have an interest in the corpus. In
such an instance there is a real danger to a title insurer. Item 2 of
Schedule A of the American Title Association Owner's Policy-
Standard Form B-196o (hereinafter called ATA Owner's Policy)
states "Title to the estate or interest covered by this Policy at the date
hereof is vested in the Insured." If the deed to A, B and C for the
benefit of X creates a partnership, then the beneficial owners have an
interest in the res along with, or exclusive of, A, B and C. It is not
certain that a title insurer would be liable under this section, but there
is a gray area here of potential liability. Of course, it could be argued
that the insurer would be protected by the language of Paragraph
2(d) of the Conditions and Stipulations, set forth above, in that the
defect was "created" by the Insured. It seems to this writer that an in-
surer is committed to a very definite position when it states in Item 2
of Schedule A that title is vested in A, B and C. It has a way out in
the instance of a trust being held to be a corporation, because title is
in A, B and C (though not in the fiduciary capacity exactly intended)
but not so with a partnership. Here title is not in A, B and C, but in
D, E, F et al, 'qua partners.'
Most states determine the question of whether a partnership is
created by the degree of control granted to the beneficial owners.
12
The theory, of course, is that if the ultimate discretion on matters of
trust policy lies with the beneficial owners, due to the sanctions they
can enforce against the trustees, these owners become in fact the policy
makers, thereby transforming the vehicle into a partnership or joint
stock association.13 Just what degree of control will effect this transfor-
mation varies from state to state. Certainly, the degree required is con-
siderably less than would be required to cause an execution of a dry or
passive trust under the Statute of Uses. The trustees can be granted con-
siderable duties, and yet the trust will violate the control test, so we cer-
tainly cannot say that the doctrine is applied by any analogy to the
Statute of Uses. One court has said "that ... the power to fill vacancies
among the trustees or to elect trustees at stated intervals, or even to
alter or amend the trust agreement" does not, ipso facto, turn the trust
"See 2 Bogert, op. cit. supra note 4, § 297 and Annot., 156 A.L.R. at 42.
lSchumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250 (1927); Frost v. Thomp-
son, 219 Mass. 36o, io6 N.E. ioog (1914).
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into a partnership.' 4 Yet, another court has held that the mere power
to amend the trust articles is enough to taint the transaction.' 5 This
writer will not attempt to set forth even a portion of the cases which
decide the degree of control necessary in each state,' 6 but a few general-
izations can perhaps be made. Usually, the right to elect trustees peri-
odically and fill vacancies will not create a partnership.' 7 However,
when shareholders are given the right to remove and replace trustees
and the right to amend the trust instrument, or either of these rights,
courts are inclined to say that a partnership does exist.'8
The situation concerning partnership status has been further
muddied by the statements of some courts that a partnership results
from the fact 'that there is an "association" among shareholders.' 9 It
might be questioned whether, under such a rule, there could be a
meeting of shareholders of any kind, regardless of the control they
exerted. It is submitted that this language of "association" is broader
than the courts really mean and refers only to those instances where
the "association" of shareholders is of such a nature as to control the
trustees. In other words, it incorporates nothing more or less than the
'control' test.
Some few states are distinctly hostile to business trusts, generally.
In those states courts will usually impose partnership liability, re-
gardless of the degree of control, on either of two theories: first,
that limited liability should be obtained only in the manner provided
by the legislature, viz. under -the corporation or limited partnership
acts, or, second, because of the provision for sharing of profits among
beneficial owners (though this latter reason is giverf little modern
support).20 Two states have gone so far as to say that formation of a
business trust is an unlawful usurpation of corporate powers and
"Levy v. Nellsi, 284 Il. App. 228, 1 N.E.2d 251 (1936).
sGoubeaux v. Krickenberger, 126 Ohio St. 302, 185 N.E. 2ox (1933).
"The reader's attention is redirected on this point to note 12 supra.
1'7Gutelius v. Stanbon, 39 F.2d 621 (D.C. Mass. 1930); Levy v. Nellis, 284 Ill. App.
228, 1 N.E.2d 251 (1936); Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 Pac. 1045 (1924);
Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins, 107 Kan. 153, 19o Pac. 6oi (1920).
28First Nat'l Bank of New Bedford v. Chartier, 3o5 Mass. 316, 25 N.E.2d 733
(194o); Frost v. Thompson, 219 Mass. 36o, io6 N.E. ioog (1914); Goubeaux v.
Krickenberger, 126 Ohio St. 302, 185 N.E. 201 (1933); Liquid Carbonic Co. v.
Sullivan, 1o3 Okla. 78, 229 Pac. 561 (1924).
"Williams v. Inhabitants of Milton, 215 Mass. i, 102 N.E. 355 (1913); Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Copeland, 39 R.I. 193, 98 AtI. 273 (1916).
"See generally, collection of cases in Bogert, op. cit. supra note 4, § 295 and
in Annot., 156 A.L.R. at 39, nl.91.
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functions and makes the trust amemable to 'quo warranto' attack.21.
It should be noted that the Rules and Regulations of the Internal
Revenue Service governing REITs provide that, in the determination
of whether the trustee has the required "exclusive authority over the
management of the trust," the trust declaration will be satisfactory,
even though the shareholders are granted the right to elect or remove
trustees, to terminate the trust and to ratify amendments to the trust
instrument proposed by the trustee.22 This test is considerably looser
than the 'control' test applied by many states, inasmuch as it authorizes
even the right to remove and replace trustees, a right found distasteful,
generally, under the 'control' test.
Because of this schism between Federal taxation requirements and
the requirements of many state courts, some REITs have been estab-
lished whose declarations of trust, relying heavily upon Federal Regu-
lations, run afoul of many states' legal precedents. In those jurisdic-
tions title insurance companies must, in such instances, make a broad
exception in any policy insuring a trust's acquisitions, to any loss or
damage arising from the legal determination that the trust is deemed
to be a partnership or that the beneficial owners are deemed, collec-
tively or individually, to be partners. This is because of the language
contained in Item 2 of Schedule A of the ATA Owner's Policy and the
coverage given therein, discussed earlier in this article.
While it is impossible to foresee all of the possible situations in
which liability might arise on the policy, a few vulnerable areas can
be set forth. For example, an individual creditor of a shareholder
might attempt to reach the trust assets, a wife might assert dower
against the trust res, a trustee in bankruptcy of a shareholder might
attempt to reach the real property held by the trust, and so forth.
Conceivably, even, dissident shareholders might assert individual
interests in the trust assets or frustrate a proposed conveyance of trust
property by the trustees by attempting to assert their rights directly
against the res of the trust.
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Many REITs have a provision in their trust instruments granting
to the trust perpetual duration. It has been stated by some writers and
authorities that such a provision violates the rule against perpetuities
and that all trusts must be limited in duration to a period not longer
2eState ex rel. Range v. Hinkle, 126 Wash. 581, 219 Pac. 41 (1923); Ohio Op.
Atty. Gen. No. 757, Aug. 19, 1919.
mSec. i.85 6-i(d) (i) Income Tax Regulations (26 C.F.R. Part i).
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than lives in being and 21 years thereafter. If this is so, it would not
appear to be because of the strict application of the rule against per-
petuities, since that rule strikes only at remoteness of vesting, and in
the typical RYIT all interests are vested immediately.23 It is only the
enjoyment that is postponed. Furthermore, it has been held that the
common law rule against restraints on alienation is not violated by a
business trust of unlimited duration. 24 Strictly speaking, in most
business trusts there is no restraint upon the right of the trustee to
sell the res of the trust (having been given the power of sale in the trust
instrument), nor is there any legal impediment to the sale of the bene-
ficial interest by the shareholder .(such interest being freely transfer-
able). Violation of the common law rule against accumulations seems
moot as far as present day REITs are concerned, because the Real
Estate Investment Trust Act of 196025 gives pass-through tax treat-
ment only to those trusts which distribute go per cent of ordinary in-
come to shareholders in any given year. Several authorities flatly state
that a business trust can be of unlimited duration and that the rule
against perpetuities and its cognate rules have no bearing upon such
trusts. 26
In spite of the above statements, there is considerable doubt as to
the validity of a provision giving perpetual duration to a business
trust. This probably springs from the doctrine of the case of Claflin v.
Claflin27 which established 'the principle of the "indestructible" trust.
Prior to this case, it had been believed that a cestui, 'sui juris' and
vested with all beneficial interests, could compel dissolution of the
trust and take possession of the res free and clear. Claflin held that, if
the settlor so intended, he could prohibit the cestui from so doing,
thereby making the trust indestructible at the hands of -the cestui.
Many states have adoped this doctrine. 28 It has given concern to many
authorities on the ground that there should be no restraint upon the
possession and enjoyment of property by one owning the entire bene-
ficial interest. It is probably for this reason that many courts have
21Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 35 N.E. 246 (1893); Howe v. Morse x74 Mass.
491, 55 N.E. 213 (i8q9); Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consol. 104 Mont. 328, 67
P.2d 811 (1937).
"Liberty Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, 25 F.2d 493
(D.C. Mass. 1928); Doty v. Mason 244 Fed. 587 (D.C. Fla. 1917).
526 U.S.C. 856-58 (Supp. II, 1959-61).
wAmerican Law of Property, § 24.67 (1952); 9 Am. Jur., Business Trusts § 3oo
(1937); 12 C.J.S., Business Trusts § 820 (1938).
27149 Mass. ig, 2o N.E. 454 (1889).
"For collection of cases on this point and annotations, see Annot., 37 A.L.R.
1420 (1925) and Annot., 169 A.L.A. 459 (1947).
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struck down trusts of unlimited duration without apparent legal rea-
son therefor. A forceful argument can be made that the ordinary REIT
is not indestructible, because at any given time all, or a stated por-
tion, of the shareholders can compel termination. But, more than one
writer has suggested that it is, in fact, indestructible as to any one
shareholder, because he alone cannot compel dissolution.29
Professor Simes30 suggests that there is a rule which restricts the
duration of private trusts, either as a varied application of the rule
against perpetuities or as a separate rule applied by analogy. Whether
it is a variation of the old rule or a completely new one seems unim-
portant. Simes points out that a trust may be an 'indirect' restraint
on alienation-that it is true that the trustee can sell the res free of
the trust, but he must have the power to do so or else he will violate
the trust provisions. In any event, he is not completely unfettered in
his ability to convey. The cestui can, likewise, assign his beneficial
interest, but it may be of dubious market value (although this is less
true of a business trust than a private trust). So, though there is no
theoretical restraint, there may be a very practical one, one which will
have the effect of tying up the property unreasonably. Because of this
indirect or practical restraint, Simes says the rule as applied to trusts
is as follows: "A private trust cannot be made indestructible, by the
provisions of the creating instrument, for a longer period than a life
or lives in being and 21 years."3 1
Apparently, many state legislatures feel that there may be a rule
which restricts the duration of trusts. Many states have enacted sta-
tutes which exempt pension, profit-sharing and similar employee trusts
from the operation of the rule against perpetuities or similar rules.3 2
Because of the unclear status of the law in this area, it is sub-
mitted that good title insurance practice dictates that no trust of per-
petual duration be insured in its acquisitions without making suit-
able exception. It may very well be held that the trust is void 'ab
initio,' for failure to comply with the rule. A very practical solution
is for a trust to limit its duration to the life of a trustee and one or
more of his children, plus 21 years thereafter. In effect this will give
the trust sufficient permanency to satisfy ordinary demands and neces-
sities.
2See, Bogert, op. cit. supra § 304 at page 394.
"ot Simes, The Law of Future Interests §§ 553 and 557.
311d. at 432.
"'See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 55-13.1 (Repi. Vol. 1959).
1963]
42 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
MERGER
Ordinarily, one cannot be -trustee for himself alone. Courts will
say that there is a merger of legal and equitable titles and that the
party concerned will own the property free from any trust obligations.
Professor Scott states: "The sole beneficiary of a trust cannot be the
sole -trustee. Where property is transferred to a person for his sole
benefit, he is absolute owner of the property and no trust is created.
A person cannot owe duties to himself. Whatever he does with the
property there is no one who can object to his doing it."' 3 This is a
logical and sensible rule of law and does not seem to be questioned by
the authorities.3 4 However, some confusion arises when -there is only
a partial identity between trustee and beneficiary, e.g., A as trustee
for A & B, A & B as trustees for A & C, etc. Is there a 'pro tanto'
merger of A's legal and equitable interests? Most authorities say there
is not. And even in the instance where A & B are trustees for A & B,
Professor Bogert suggests that there should be no merger, if for no
other reason than that A & B hold legal title as joint tenants and
equitable title as tenants in common.35 The question of 'pro tanto'
merger in business trusts has been faced on several occasions. It
is not unusual that some of the trustees of such a trust also own
shares of beneficial interest. The general rule is that there is no
'pro tanto' merger.3 6 "The trust does not -terminate by merger, either
in whole or in part, where the sole beneficiary of the trust does not
become the sole trustee. It will not terminate merely because one of
several beneficiaries becomes the sole trustee, or the sole beneficiary is
one of several trustees."37
In spite of the foregoing, at least two states have said that there will
'5 Scott, Trusts § 341 (2d ed. 1956).
8 See 2 Bogert, op. cit. supra, note 4, § 129 at 549-5o and cases cited therein.
m Id., § 129 at 554-55.
"Hammick v. Bryan, 21 F. Supp. 392 (D.C. Okla. 1937) vac. io6 F.2d 245, cert.
denied 3o8 U.S. 615; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 320 Ill. App. 221, 50
N.E.2d 434 (1934); Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 748, 1 S.W.2d 163 (1927); Baker v.
Stern, 194 Wis. 233, 216 N.W. 147 (1927).
In the Darling case, supra, the Court said "In the instant case managers were
subscribers, but we can see no reason under the circumstances here existing why each
did not incur the dual relation as beneficiary to the extent of his individual
subscription and trustee as to all others. The beneficial interest of a manager to
share in the profits as a subscriber to the fund was not commensurate with his
interest as a trustee."
See generally, 9 Am. Jur., Business Trusts § 20 (1937); 12 C.J.S., Business
Trusts § 19a (1938).
813 Scott, op. cit. supra note 33, § 341.2. To same effect, see 2 Restatement
(Second), Trusts § 341 c, f and h (1959).
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be a merger of legal and equitable interests as to that portion owned
by any trustee.38 And yet another state has held that there will be a
merger when all of the shareholders of a Massachusetts trust are also
all of the trustees.39 The latter situation would not seem to be a
serious problem with present day REITs, because, to get the pass-
through tax treatment, there must be ioo or more shareholders, 40 and
it is not likely that a REIT will have ioo or more trustees. In states
which subscribe to the doctrine of 'pro tanto' merger, a title insurer
must state in its policy that the portion of the insured property rep-
resented in ownership by the shares held by any trustee, or trustees,
is held by such trustee, or trustees, in fee simple, rather than upon
trust.
RECORDATION OF DECLARATION OF TRUST
A purchaser of real estate is charged with notice of matters ap-
pearing in deeds in his chain of title and is, hence, charged with
notice of the existence and terms of a trust instrument, reference
to which is made in any of those deeds.41 "Persons dealing with a trus-
tee must take notice of the scope of his authority; and even a third
person taking a title which comes through a trustee, and having
notice of facts which should put him on inquiry whether the trustee
was acting within the scope of his authority, is not protected" 42 Cer-
tainly, then, a purchaser from the trustees of a REIT would be charged
with notice of any restrictions or conditions upon the power of sale,
Ware v. Busch, io8 Fla. 153, 146 So. 197 (1933); Huggins v. Whitaker, 1oo
Fla. 6oo, 129 So. 857 (1930); Walker v. Close, 98 Fla. 110 3, 125 So. 521 (1929); Willey
v. W. J. Hoggson Corp., go Fla. 343, io6 So. 408 (1925); Foster v. Glover, 46 S.C.
522, 24 S.E. 370 (1896). "If a person should grant land to A in fee in trust for A,
could anyone doubt that the grantor intended that A should have the fee? Would
it not be equally certain, if he should convey the land in fee to A in trust for A,
B, C, D and E, that the grantor intended A to have an estate fee in one-fifth of
the land?" Foster v.Glover, supra. The Florida cases, Willey v. W. J. Hoggson and
Walker v. Close, supra, are interesting on another point. The former had stated
with rather sweeping language, that an attempt to create a common-law trust was
nothing more or less than an effort to avoid the liabilities of a partnership and to
acquire the rights and privileges of a corporation without complying with Florida
corporation laws and that only a partnership or joint stock association resulted
with shareholders jointly and severally liable. Yet, the latter case recognized that
a business trust could be created if done properly and distinguished Willey on
the ground that a trustee was also a beneficiary.
Enochs 8. Flowers v. Roell, 170 Miss. 44, 154 So. 299 (1934).
4026 U.S.C. 856(a)(5) (Supp. II, 1959-61).
"Page v. Natural Gas & Fuel Co., 35 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1929); accord, Simmons
Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U.S. 417 (1892).
428 Thompson, Commentaries on the Modem Law of Real Property § 45oo
(1940).
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provided, of course, that there is record notice of the trust in his chain
of 'title and no recitation of the trustees' powers. Such a purchaser
would, therefore, be within his rights in demanding examination of
the trust instrument. Failure to place the instrument of record or to
supply the purchaser with a copy thereof would render the title un-
marketable.43 The ATA Owner's Policy, mentioned earlier, insures
"against loss or damage... which the insured shall sustain by reason
of... unmarketability of ... title." Because of this coverage a title in-
surance company must require that the declaration of trust be placed
of record,4 4 in order that there be no question of the marketability of
title in the hands of a purchaser from the trust.
Another reason for requiring that the declaration of trust be placed
of record is that property might come to the trustees by deed with-
out reference to the trust and without designation of the grantees
as trustees, making it appear of record that title is vested individu-
ally and not upon trust. As a protection against the subsequent con-
veyance to a bona fide purchaser, thereby rendering the property
free of the trust in his hands, some record notice of the trustees' fidu-
ciary status must be made.
TRuST AS AN ENTITY
It is fundamental in real property law that a deed must have a
grantee capable of taking title. The question arises as to whether
a REIT, as an unincorporated association, is an entity and whether it
can take title in its own name, rather than in the nayne of the trus-
tees. 45 One authority has shrewdly observed: "It may be said -that if
partnerships are creatures of contract and corporations of statute,
unincorporated associations are creatures of the devil since only his
satanic majesty knows what -they are."46 While some cases hold that
a Massachusetts, or business, trust is an entity,47 it is submitted that
"Resnick v. Goldman, 1i3 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Slomkowski v.
Levitas, 9 N.J. Misc. 854, 156 Ad. 8 (Sup. Ct. ig3i), aft'd, 1o9 N.JJ.. 545, 162 At.
530 (Ct. Err. & App.).
"An alternative would be for the insurer to hold in its files a conformed or
executed copy of the declaration of trust to show to prospective purchasers. This
would not seem to be a satisfactory solution, however, because of the practical dif-
ficulties that may be involved in having the agreement readily accessible at any
time or place.
"Federal Tax Regulations authorize this. Sec. 1 856 (d) (i) (26 C.F.R. Part 1).
"wrhompson, op. cit. supra note 42, § 3012 at 407.
'TRemington v. Krenn & Dato, Inc., 289 Ill. App. 548, 7 N.E.2d 6W8 (1937);
Beikin v. Kxenn & Dato, Inc., 350 Ill. 284, 183 N.E. 33o (1932); Hodgkiss v. Northland
Petroleum Consol., 1o4 Mont. 328, 67 P.2d 8uL (1937); Brown v. Bedell, 263 N.Y.
177, 188 N.E. 641 (1934).
TITLE INSURANCE
most states would apply normal trust rules and say that the trust is not
an entity and that title must be taken and held by the trustees and
not in the name of the trust.48 It has been held that when title is vested
in the trustees, other officers of the trust cannot convey the property.4 9
Because of the very sparse authority holding a Masachusetts trust
to be an entity, a -title insurer must insist that the acquisitions and con-
veyances of a REIT be made in the names of the trustees, except in
Montana and, possibly, Illinois.
USE OF A NOMINEE
The Federal Tax Regulations issued under the Real Estate In-
vestment Trust Act authorize title to real property to be taken "in
the name of a nominee for the exclusive benefit of the trust."50 Many
trust representatives have suggested that this procedure be followed in
order that a title insurance policy may be issued free from exceptions
or requirements based upon some or all of the title objections set
out in this article. While it would be a desirable result, such a pro-
cedure does not present a solution to the problems or change the
situation in any substantial manner. The trust can take title in the
name of a nominee and the policy can show title in him, but the ex-
ceptions and requirements must remain as before. The nominee tak-
ing title will hold on a resulting trust in favor of the party who ad-
vanced the consideration 51-the particular REIT concerned. The trus-
tees could enforce this resulting trust in an equitable action, and,
therefore, any defect assertable against the trust would also lie against
the nominee. It could also be held that the nominee is a mere agent
of the trust.52 Whether resulting trustee or agent, the nominee's rights
rise no higher than the real party in interest. There has been no "insu-
lation" created or afforded by the act. If the title insurer is aware of
the relationship between trust and nominee, it must show all title mat-
ters that affect the trust. Not only must it do this as good underwriting
procedure, but also as a matter of information. Title insurance poli-
cies are often used to give information to prospective purchasers or
mortgagees. It would be deceptive to show clear title in a nominee if
such were not the case and the title insurance company were aware
of the relationship. It has been satisfactory to some trusts to have
dsSee collection of cases in Thompson, op. cit supra note 42, § So12 nn.83-86.
"Ward v. Davis, 3 Sandf. 502 (N.Y. Super. 1850); Willis v. Greiner, 26 S.W. 858
(Te. 1894).
ODSection 1. 856-1 (d) (i) (26 C.F.R. Part 1).
"Bogert, op. cit. supra note 4, §§454 and 461.
"Id. at § 15.
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a single exception in the policy, excepting to loss or damage arising
from the fact that the nominee holds title for the REIT and not in
his own right, rather than one or more of the other exceptions set forth
or indicated in this article. The feeling seems to be that such language
is more saleable to prospective mortgagees, purchasers and share-
holders.
REMEDIAL LEGISLATION
Many states have been quick to see the potentiality of the REIT
and have enacted legislation that is most helpful in many instances to
clear up some of the problems raised herein. The following states
have enacted such legislation, as of the time of this writing: Alabama,53
California,54 Georgia, 55 Kansas,56 Louisiana, 57 Mississippi,58 Nebras-
ka,59 New York,60 South Carolina,61 Tennessee, 62 Texas,63 Virginia, 4
and Washington.65 Some statutes are better drawn than others, but
all are helpful in resolving some or all of the problems raised herein.
It is hoped that more states will follow the lead of these states, because
the REIT can be an attractive and useful device. It can provide a
means of investment not ordinarily available to the average investor,
and it can be a source of concentrated investment capital not now
existing.
"Ala. Code tit. 58, §§ 29-(1) - (8) (Supp. 1961).
6Cal. Corp. Code §§ 2300 - 03.
5Ga. Code §§ io8-6oi - o9 (Supp. 1961).
6Kans. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-2027 - 38 (Supp. 1961).
WLa. Rev. Stat. tit. 12, ch. 4, Pt. V (1950).
58Miss. Laws 1962, S.B. 1698.
5'Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-632 - 33 (Supp. ig6i).
'N.Y. Laws 196i, chs. 341-45.
'S.C. Code §§ 52-201 - 05 (1962).
'Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-1801 - 04. (Supp. 1962).
rex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 613 8A.
6'Va. Code Ann. §§ 6-577 - 85 (Supp. 1962).
O*Wash. Laws 1959, ch. 220.
